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Vance: Indian Law - Ownership of Lands Underlying Navigable Waters and L

INDIAN LAW-Ownership of Lands Underlying Navigable Waters and Limits
to Tribal Sovereignty. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.__ , 101 S. Ct.
1245 (1981).

The Crow Indian Reservation occupies more than two
million acres of land in the State of Montana.' The Big Horn
River flows through the middle of the reservation. The river
provides an excellent habitat for trout and duck and is
therefore a popular hunting and fishing ground.
In 1973, the Crow Tribal Council passed a resolution barring anyone not a member of the Crow Tribe from hunting and
fishing on the reservation. The Tribe's primary concern was to
limit hunting and fishing on the Big Horn River. The Tribal
Council stated that the purpose of its action was to insure the2
continued availability of game as a food source for the Crow.
The State of Montana did not accept the Tribe's assertion
of authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
within the reservation. Therefore, Montana continued to announce the opening and closing of hunting seasons on all reservation lands. The State also continued to issue licenses to non3
tribal members to hunt and fish within the reservation.
In an attempt to resolve the conflict between Montana and
the Crow Tribe, the United States, in its own right and as
fiduciary for the Tribe, initiated this suit in the Federal
District Court for the District of Montana. 4 The United States
requested:
(1) a declaratory judgment quieting title to the bed of
the Big Horn River in the United States as trustee
for the Crow Tribe;
(2) a declaratory judgment establishing that all authority to regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation belongs to the Crow Indians and the United
States; and
(3) an injunction preventing Montana from issuing hunting and fishing licenses for use within the reservation without the Tribe's permission. 5
Copyright© 1982 by the University of Wyoming.

1. The Crow Indian Reservation was established by the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie in
1868. Several Acts of Congress have reduced it from its original size of 8 million acres to
slightly less than 2.3 million acres. Montana v. United States, _
Ct. 1245, 1249 (1981).

U.S.

., 101 S.

2. Brief for Respondent United States at 5, Montana v. United States, supra note 1.
3. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1165 (1979).

4. United States v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mont. 1978).
5. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1250.
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The District Court found for the State of Montana on all
counts.8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the District Court's decision. 7 The appellate court decided that
the United States held title to the bed of the Big Horn River
for the Crow Tribe. The court also found that the Tribe could
prohibit non-members from hunting and fishing within the
reservation, unless the non-members were resident fee-owners
of reservation lands. Further, the court held that the Crow
could regulate hunting and fishing on the reservation by nonmembers, subject to the limitation that the Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on non-Indians. Finally, the court
found that the State of Montana had the power to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-tribal members within the reservation.8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Court of Appeals' decision. In an opinion written by
Justice Stewart, the Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 9 The
Court found that the State of Montana held title to the bed of
the Big Horn River.10 The Court further found that the Crow
Tribe possessed no authority to regulate or prohibit hunting
and fishing on reservation lands owned in fee by non-members
of the Tribe. 1 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissented from that part of the Court's opinion
pertaining to ownership of the riverbed. 12 Justice Stevens
wrote a concurring opinion.13
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Treaties
The Crow Indians migrated from Canada to the region
they now occupy approximately three centuries ago. Following
the discovery of gold in California in the 1840's, the number of
white emigrants travelling through the Crow's land increased
greatly. The travellers destroyed great quantities of buffalo
and other game, timber and grass in their journey westward.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. (citing United States v.
Id. (citing United States v.
United States v. Montana,
Montana v. United States,
Id. at 1254.

Montana, supra note 4).
Montana, supranote 3).
supra note 3, at 1165-66.
supra note 1, at 1259.

11. Id,
12. Id. at 1259.
13. I& at 1265.
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The Indians were angered by the damage to the sources of
from time to time expressed their wrath
their sustenance, and
14
through violence.
In an effort to secure safe passage for its citizens, the
United States in 1851 entered into a treaty with the Crow and
several other Indian tribes. The agreement is known as the
First Treaty of Fort Laramie.' 6 The treaty provided that the
United States would protect the Indians against depredations
by its citizens. The Indians on their part agreed to
acknowledge distinct territories as their own, to make restitution for wrongs committed against United States citizens, and
to keep peace among themselves. 16
Although the Crow fulfilled their obligations under this
agreement, the United States failed in its duty to protect the
Tribe from depredations by whites.17 Ever-increasing numbers
of white men passed through or settled within Crow territory.
In another attempt to resolve the conflicting demands by the
whites for land to settle and by the Indians for protection of
their source of livelihood, the United States negotiated
another agreement with the Crow. This treaty, called the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, was signed in 1868.18
The 1868 treaty promised that a portion of the territory occupied by the Crow under the 1851 treaty would be set apart as
a reservation for their exclusive and undisturbed use. The
treaty also promised that no non-Indian, except agents of the
government, should "ever be permitted to pass over, settle
upon, or reside in" the Crow's land. 19 The Crow in return relinquished all claims they had to any land outside the borders of
their reservation.20
B. The Allotment Acts
The General Allotment Act of 188721 marked the firm
establishment of a new trend in federal Indian policy. Up until
14. Crow Nation v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 238, 242 (1935).
15. Treaty of Fort Laramie, September 17, 1851, reprintedin KAPPLER, 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS:
LAWS AND TREATIES 594 (1904)[hereinafter cited in text as 1851 treaty].

16. Id.
17. Crow Nation v. United States, supra note 14, at 247.

18. Treaty with the Crow Indians, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649 [hereinafter cited in text as 1868
treaty].
19. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1254-55 (quoting Treaty with the Crow Indians, supra note 18).
20. Treaty with the Crow Indians, supranote 18.
21. The General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C.
331-358 (1976)).
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the 1870's Congress had followed a policy of separation in its
dealings with the Indians, which was reflected by the establishment of reservations. Then, after the Civil War, the sentiment
began to grow among members of Congress and the public,
that Indians deserved the benefits of white civilization. 22 Allotment was the means by which Congress intended to break up
tribal culture and clear the way for Indians to become
23
civilized.
The General Allotment Act provided for the apportionment of reservation lands among individual members of the
Tribe.24 After a specified period of time the land could be
alienated to non-Indians.25 When the process of allotment was
complete, allottees and Indians who left the tribe and took up
civilized life would become United States citizens, subject to
federal and state law. 26 Special acts, of which the Crow Allotment Act was one, were passed to facilitate the process among
individual tribes. 27
The process, however, was never completed. For many
28
reasons, allotment failed to prove itself a benefit to Indians.
In 1934, the policy of allotment was discontinued under the Indian Reorganization Act.2 9 This Act did not repeal the General
22. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDAN LAw 207-09 (1945) (citing History of the Allot-

ment Policy: Hearings on HR. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 428-89 (1934) (statement of D. S. Otis). Cohen quoted from the
Otis statement extensively throughout Chapter II of his handbook. According to Cohen,
this article provided the primary factual basis for termination of the allotment system.
COHEN, supra at 206.
23. Id. at 208.
24. The General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, S 1, 24 Stat. 388.
25. Each allottee was to receive a patent for his land which would be held in trust by the
United States for a period of 25 years. Barring extensions of the trust period, the allottee
would then own the patent in fee, free from restrictions on alienation. Id. S 5.
26. Id. S 6. In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463,477-79 (1976), the State of Montana attempted to justify its taxation of Indians living on allotted reservation lands by
arguing the continuing vitality of this section of the General Allotment Act. The Supreme
Court rejected the State's argument. The Court noted that while the General Allotment
Act had never been repealed formally, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 repudiated
the concept of tribal dissolution on which the Allotment Act had been based. Consequently, the Court found, Section 6 could possess no current significance.
27. The Crow Allotment Act of 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751.
28. D. S.Otis noted, among possible reasons for the allotment system's failure:
(1) that it emphasized agriculture, though much of the Indian's land was not
suitable for farming,
(2) that the Government failed to give adequate aid to the allottees, and
(3) that allowing the Indians to lease the land did not encourage them to
develop into self-sufficient farmers.
Whatever the reasons, the end result of the policy was that most Indians did not develop
into self-supporting citizens but moved steadily towards total poverty. COHEN, supra
note 22, at 211-16 (citing History of the Allotment Policy).
29. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. SS
461479 (1976)).
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Allotment Act but prohibited further allotment of reservation
lands. 30 Provisions of the Reorganization Act extended the existing trust periods on alloted lands indefinitely, 3' and generally prohibited alienation of restricted Indian lands. 2 Further
provisions acted to strengthen tribal government.-The total
Indian forms of governeffect was to reinstitute traditional
34
ment and property ownership.
Unfortunately, reorganization of the tribes took place
after non-Indians became fee owners of land within the reservations. 35 Thus, while the reservations were returned to a
policy of tribal ownership and control, they were no longer the
exclusive preserves of Indians. 36 The resulting confusion between individual property rights and tribal rights traditionally
guaranteed by treaty was the source for several of the issues
addressed by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States.
THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP

The first question the Supreme Court addressed in Montana involved interpretation of the United States' 1868 Treaty
with the Crow Tribe. The question was whether under the
terms of the treaty, the United States had reserved the bed of
the Big Horn River from the conveyance it made to the
Crow.3 7 A question existed because the Big Horn River is a
38
navigable waterway, subject to particular legal doctrines.

In English common law, the land under all navigable
waters belongs to the sovereign.3 9 After the American Revolution, the various states received title to those lands as part of
30.25 U.S.C. S 461 (1976).
31.25 U.S.C. S 462 (1976).
32.25 U.S.C. 464 (1976).
33.25 U.S.C. SS 476-477 (1976).
34. The reinstitution of traditional tribal ways was a voluntary choice for the Indians. The
Act provided that tribes could vote against its application to their reservations. 25 U.S.C.
S 478 (1976).
35. The Reorganization Act did not attempt to alter the title possessed by Indians who owned
unrestricted patents in fee or non-Indians who purchased from them. See note 25 supra.
36. The present ownership of the Crow reservation breaks down as follows:
52%
Allotted to members of the Crow Tribe
17%
Tribally owned
28%
Owned by non-members
2%
Owned by the State of Montana
1%
Owned by United States
Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1249.
37. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1250.
38. Id. at 1251.
39. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
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their sovereign powers. 40 Thereafter, in order that each new
state should be admitted to the Union on an "equal footing"
with the rest, the federal government generally reserved land
underlying navigable waters from conveyances of territorial
41
property.
Nevertheless, Congress does have the power to convey
such lands, and defeat the title of a future state in order to
carry out certain public purposes.42 The establishment of an Indian reservation can be an appropriate purpose under this
rule. 43 However, some special exigency must exist before the
Court will find that a conveyance has taken place. 44 Consequently, courts which decide the question of title to lands
under navigable waters must begin with a presumption against
conveyance 45 and not infer one
unless the intention to convey
46
plain.
made
or
declared
was
Prior to its decision in Montana, the Supreme Court had
addressed the question whether lands under navigable waters
were included in a grant of reservation lands in only three
cases.47 Two of those cases hold particular importance for the
present discussion. 48 One, United States v. Holt State Bank,49
is important because the Court relied on it so heavily in
deciding Montana. The other case, Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma,50 is important because its relevant facts so closely
resemble those in Montana. Further, Choctaw is important
because until the Court's decision in Montana, Choctaw appeared to represent the trend of the Court's decisions in this
area on the issue of riverbed ownership.5 1 These two cases,
therefore, merit special examination at this point.
40. Id.

41. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1251 (citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222-23 (1845).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1251 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 9, at 48).
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1251 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)).
Id. (citing United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 44).
The three cases are: Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); United States v.
Holt State Bank, supra note 44; and Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S.
78 (1918).

48. The third case, Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, supra note 47, is not as important to the present discussion because it played no part in the Court's decision and
because its factual situation is very different from the one in the present case.
49. See note 44 supra.
50. See note 47 supra.
51. See Note, Indian Rights to Lands Underlying Navigable Waters: State Jurisdiction
Under the Equal FootingDoctrine vs. Tribal Sovereignty. 55 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 453-74
(1979).
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The Supreme Court ruled on Holt in 1926. At issue was
title to the bed of Mud Lake, located on what had been the Red
Lake Indian Reservation of Minnesota. The Supreme Court
found there was nothing in the manner of the creation of Red
Lake Reservation to indicate an intent to convey the lake bed.
In its decision, the Court noted there had been no formal setting apart of land for the reservation, or declaration of the
Indian's rights, or attempted exclusion of outsiders from the
navigable waters. Rather, through a series of treaties the land
had been set apart in a general way for the use of the Indians
and thus had come to be recognized as a reservation.5 2 Consequently, the Court concluded that the lake bed belonged to the
state.

53

The Court's decision in Choctaw settled a dispute between
several Indian tribes and the State of Oklahoma over title to
the bed of the Arkansas River. The Indians claimed title from
treaties that established their reservation. These treaties
granted designated lands to the Indians in fee simple for as
long as they should exist as nations and live on the land. In
addition, the treaties provided that the Indians' land would
would any state have the right to
never be a part of a state, nor
54
pass laws for their nation.
The Court found that the treaty description of the Indians'
lands, specifying only exterior boundaries, clearly included all
lands within the boundaries, and therefore included the riverbed. 55 More important to the Court, however, than the particular language of the grant, were the long-recognized rules
of Indian treaty construction. Those rules as stated by the
Choctaw Court, were:
(1) that treaties must be interpreted as the Indians
would have understood them, and
(2) that doubtful expressions in 56treaties should be construed in the Indian's favor.
The circumstances of the grant and the application of the rules
for construing Indian treaties were enough, in the Court's
52. United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 44, at 58 (citing Minnesota v. Hitchcock,
185 U.S. 373, 389 (1902)).
53. Id. at 59.

54. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, supra note 47, at 625.
55. Id. at 628.
56. Id. at 631.
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view, to overcome the presumption against conveyance of
lands under navigable waters. Therefore the Court found that
the U.S. held title to the riverbed in trust for the tribes. 7
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for five members of the
Court, began the majority opinion's analysis of Montanawith
an examination of the Court's decision in Holt. He stated that
the Crow treaties, like the treaties examined in Holt, failed to
overcome the presumption against conveyance of the beds of
navigable waters. The majority found no express conveyance
of the riverbed, nor any clear intentions to convey it. Instead,
they found that the effect of the Crow treaties was identical to
that of the Chippewa treaties in Holt: to reserve in a general
way what remained of the Indians' territory. 8
In making its comparison between Holt and Montana, the
Court failed to note a critical distinction between the two
cases. In Holt, the Court's statement of the treaties' effects
followed directly from the Court's recognition that there was
no treaty expressly setting apart a reservation for the Indians
concerned, nor any affin-mative declaration of the Indians'
rights in their land.5 9 The opposite, however, was true in Montana. The 1868 treaty contains both a formal setting apart of
land not ceded by the Indians and an affirmative declaration of
the Indians' rights to the exclusive use of that land. The
resemblance between the effects of the treaties in Holt and
Montana is thus slight.
The Montana Court further stated that the grant to the
Crows of the exclusive right to occupy the lands within the
reservation's borders, did not support the inference that the
riverbed was included in those lands. All parties conceded that
the United States retains a navigational easement in all
navigable waters for the benefit of the public. Therefore,
regardless of who owned the riverbed, that easement would
prevent the Crow from restricting travel on the river. Consequently, the Court found that one could not infer an intent to
grant all the land within the reservation's borders from a grant
of exclusive use of those lands. 60 The Court apparently reason57. Id. at 635.
58. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1252.
59. See United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 44, at 58.

60. Montana v. United States, supranote 1, at 1252-53.
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ed that if exclusivity could be a diluted concept, then the actual
grant of lands could be diluted, too.
The Court's construction of the treaty grant of specific
lands is totally contrary to the construction the Court gave to a
similar grant in Choctaw. The Court noted there that the
treaty described the land reserved to the Indians by
delineating only external boundaries. The Choctaw Court interpreted this description as clearly encompassing all the lands
within the described boundaries, including the bed of the
Arkansas."'
The Montanamajority failed to explain the difference in its
construction of treaty language. Possibly one may imply an explanation from its discussion of Choctaw. The majority's entire
treatment of the most recent precedent to its 2decision was
relegated to footnote 5 of the majority opinion.
In that footnote, the majority sought to distinguish Choctaw on its facts. The majority found significant the fact that
the Choctaw were relocated to the land-they now occupy. 63 The
Court majority did not explain, however, why these historical
origins should give the Choctaw a better claim to lands
underlying navigable waters than the Crow, whose lands were
part of the territory thay had occupied prior to the arrival of
64
white men.

The Montana majority also found crucial to the Court's
resolution of Choctaw, the fact that the Indians in that case
received a grant in fee simple to their lands, as well as a promise of freedom from state jurisdiction. 65 As the dissent in
Montana noted, however, a careful reading of Choctaw fails to
yield the same conclusions." The treaty provisions in Choctaw
which provided that the Indians' lands would never be included
in any state, were important to the Choctaw Court only to the
67
extent that they helped to construe the United States' intent.
61. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, supra note 47, at 628.
62. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1253 n.5.

63. Id.
64. Justice Blackmun commented that "if anything. . . the Crow Indians would have had an
even greater expectancy... that the rivers encompassed by their reservation would con-

tinue to belong to them." Id. at 1261 n.9 (dissenting opinion).
65. Id. at 1253 n.5.
66. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1262 n.ll (dissenting opinion).
67. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, supra note 47, at 635.
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The grant in fee was not a grant of fee simple absolute, but was
conditioned on the Indians remaining a nation and continuing
to occupy the land. 68 The critical distinction between the rights
conveyed by a conditional fee simple grant and the rights
possessed by the Crow Indians under the 1868 treaty, is not
readily apparent. The Court does not offer to explain the difference it sees.
Whether or not the title granted in Choctaw was
significantly different from the title the Crows received
through the 1868 treaty, the Court in Choctaw gave no indication that the fee grant was important to its decision. The Choctaw Court's entire discussion centered on the construction of
treaty terms that described the lands to be reserved. The
crucial factor in the Court's analysis of those terms was not the
nature of the grant by which the lands were transferred, but
the application to the terms of the rules requiring Indian
treaties to be construed as the Indians would have understood
them.
The majority opinion in Montana failed to acknowledge
that the Court in Choctaw even considered special principles of
construction for Indian treaties, much less that the Choctaw
Court found them extremely important to its decision. In fact,
the majority in Montana never acknowledged that such principles exist, though the Court had previously applied them in
case after case involving Indian treaties.69 The District Court
in Montana, even though it eventually found for the State, set
out in detail the principles of Indian treaty construction
as
' 70
based.
are
cases
Indian
which
upon
"the presumptions
Possibly, the Montana majority failed to acknowledge the
principles because the Court in Holt, the case relied on most
heavily in Montana, did not acknowledge them. The Holt
Court, however, did not construe the terms of any treaty since
it noted that none specifically set apart land for the Indians or
made an affirmative declaration of these rights. Since the
Indians in Holt received no grant of exclusive possession or
assurance that their land would never be used for anything
68. Id. at 625.
69. See Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, supra note 47.
70. United States v. Montana, supra note 4, at 607.
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else,7 1 the Holt court did not have to determine the significance
of these rights. In Holt, therefore, the Court focused on the circumstances of the grant to the Indians rather than particular
terms.
The Court in Montana, on the other hand, was faced with
specific treaty terms to construe. The possible justification for
the Court's failure to acknowledge established rules of construction in Holt is not available to the majority in Montana.
The Court offered no explanation for the omission, so one cannot know if the Court will neglect to apply the rules in future
Indian treaty cases. If the rules retain their vitality, then the
Court's decision in Montanamay have little precedential value.
That the Court declined to follow Choctaw, a 1970 case
with a decidedly similar factual underpinning, in favor of Holt,
a 1926 case arising under substantially different circumstances, is disturbing. Even more disturbing is the Court's
summary disposal of Choctaw by distinguishing it on its facts in
a footnote. The most disquieting aspect of this portion of the
Court's decision, however, is the Court's failure to
acknowledge, much less employ, the hitherto firmly established principles governing treaty construction. What this
forebodes for the resolution of future treaty construction cases
is difficult to tell. At the least, one may note that the Court
entered a field where the governing legal principles were wellestablished, disrupted the long-established chain of precedent,
and departed without one word of explanation for its action.
THE QUESTION OF TRIBAL AUTHORITY

Following its resolution of the riverbed ownership question, the Court turned to examine the extent of the Tribe's
authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on
reservation land owned in fee by non-members of the Tribe.
The appellate court found that the Crow treaties, and the
Tribe's inherent sovereignty, gave the Crow the authority to
72
regulate hunting and fishing on all parts of their reservation.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the lower court's
73
conclusions.
71. Id. at 606.
72. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1254.

73. Id.
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The Court noted that the 1868 treaty may well have given
the Tribe authority to control hunting and fishing within the
bounds of the reservation. The Court found, however, that this
authority was limited to land on which the Crow still retained
their right to exclusive use and occupancy.7 4 The Court said
that "it defied common sense" to think Congress intended that
the purchasers of allotments would become subject to tribal
jurisdiction, when one purpose of the Allotment Acts was the
eventual dissolution of tribal government. 75 The case of
Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Department, the Court
said, supported the principle that treaty rights in reservation
lands may be affected by the subsequent alienation of those
lands. 16 The Court did not offer any other authority for its
characterization of the status of non-Indian landholders within
the reservation. If authority is to be found for the Court's
remarks, it must come from cases the Court discussed in examining the nature of Indian sovereignty.
The Court began its examination of Indian sovereignty by
noting its discussion of the concept in United States v.
Wheeler.77 In Wheeler the Court found that although Indian
tribes possessed attributes of sovereignty, they had lost many
of those attributes through their incorporation into the United
States, and through treaties and statutes. The Court in
Wheeler decided that the Indians' loss of sovereignty had
occurred in the area of relations between Indian tribes and
non-members of the tribes, because sovereignty in this area
8
was inconsistent with the tribes' dependent status.7
The Montana Court added to the above-cited principles the
statement that any exercise of tribal power beyond that which
is necessary to regulate internal affairs or protect tribal selfgovernment "cannot survive without express Congressional
delegation." 7 9 The Montana Court cited a line of cases as sup74. Id. at 1255.
75. Id. at 1255 n.9.
76. Id. at 1256. In that case, the Court found that the Indians' exclusive right to fish had been
diluted by the alienation of reservation land to non-members. Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Game Dep't., 433 U.S. 165,174 (1977). Puyallupmay be distinguished from
Montanahowever on the basis that so much of the reservation was owned by non-Indians
there was a question as to whether it still existed. Id. at 173 n.1l.
77. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
78. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1257 (quoting United States v. Wheeler,
supra note 77).
79. Montana v. United States, supra note 1,at 1257.
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port for its conclusion regarding tribal power.80 The principle
embodied in these cases is commonly called the test of
Williams v. Lee."1
The test provides that state laws may apply on reservations, but only when they do not conflict with a federal statute
and only when they do not interfere with a tribe's right to selfgovernment.8 2 The Montana Court's statement that a tribe's
exercise of sovereign authority beyond certain limits is invalid
absent express Congressional authorization, seriously distorts
the Williams v. Lee test. Under the Montana Court's analysis,
a rule previously used to determine the limits of state authority
over Indian reservations, becomes instead a test for the valid
exercise of tribal authority.
The Montana Court employed its reformulation of
Williams v. Lee to decide that regulation by the Crow Tribe of
hunting and fishing on lands no longer tribally owned was an
unauthorized exercise of tribal power. The Court found that
such regulation was not clearly related to tribal selfgovernment or the tribe's internal affairs.8 3 The Court cited
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe in support of its
position. 4 Although Oliphant expressly applied only to a
tribe's jurisdiction over criminal activities, the Court said that
the case stood for the general proposition that an Indian tribe's
inherent sovereign powers do not extend to non-tribal
members' activities."5
The Court then noted several instances in which Indian
tribes do retain some sovereign power over the activities of
non-Indians. The Court expressly stated that Indians retain
sovereignty in these circumstances even when the activities
the Tribe desires to regulate take place on reservation lands
owned by non-Indians.8 8 According to the Montana Court, permissible exercises of tribal sovereignty over the activities of
non-Indians include:
80. Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959); and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1885)).
81. Williams v. Lee, supra note 80.
82. Id. at 220.
83. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1257-58.
84. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra note 69.
85. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1258.
86. Id.
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(1) regulation by licensing, taxing or other means, of
consensual relationships between the Tribe or its
members and nonmembers; and
(2) regulation of conduct that threatens or directly
affects the political integrity,8 7 economic security,
health or welfare of the Tribe.
The Court found that nothing in this case brought the
activities in question within the scope of legitimate exercise of
tribal authority. The Court stated that hunters and fishermen
on non-Indian owned lands within the reservation do not enter
into any consensual relationships with the tribe. The Court
stated further that no harm to the Crow's welfare was alleged
by the complaint in the District Court. Finally, the Court found
no threat to the Tribe's political integrity in the non-Indians'
activities."8 The Court noted that the State's regulation did not
infringe on the Tribe's right to regulate hunting and fishing on
lands still held in trust for or owned by the Tribe and its
members. Furthermore, the Court found that the Tribe traditionally acquiesced in the State's regulation of non-members. 8 9
While the Montana Court's analysis emphasized the limits
on tribal sovereignty, the Court nevertheless admitted that
Indian tribes retain some soverign powers. Though the Court
apparently imposed new limits on those powers through its
reformulation of the test in Williams v. Lee, and through its
extension of the rule in Oliphant, it cited broad exceptions to
the strictures of its rules.
The Court found that the facts in Montana did not bring
the case under one of the exceptions allowing exercise of
Indian sovereignty over non-Indians. However, similar regulations by other Indian tribes would not necessarily be invalidated through this analysis. The Court's decision in Montana appears to depend at least in part on the Crow Tribe's
failure to show that it was harmed by the non-members'
activities. A showing that non-members' activities within the
reservation adversely affected tribal rights appears to open
those activities to tribal regulation. From the Court's
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1258-59.
89. Id. at 1259 (citing United States v. Montana, supra note 4, at 609-10).
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statements, this holds true whether or not the activities take
place on land owned by non-members. The question in future
cases decided under the Montana analysis will be whether the
degree of impact is sufficient to validate tribal regulation.
The Montana court, through its analysis of Indian
sovereign powers, both supported and limited its "common
sense" declaration of the rights of non-Indian fee owners of
reservation lands. 90 The limits on tribal power to regulate
activities taking place on reservation lands owned by nonIndians do not derive simply from the fact that the lands were
alienated to non-Indians. Neither does the fact that the lands
were alienated to non-Indians exempt those landowners from
all tribal regulation.
Whether or not Congress intended purchasers of allotted
lands to take them free from Indian control, 91 the Indian
Reorganization Act and subsequent federal statutes and
Supreme Court cases confirm that Indian tribes have never
lost all their attributes of sovereignty. The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Mazurie, stated that Indian tribes possess a
measure of sovereignty over their territory as well as their
members.9 2 The "territory" the Court referred to in that statement clearly embraced reservation lands owned by nonIndians. 93 The Mazurie Court's statement was cited with approval in United States v. Wheeler,94 and again in the Court's
opinion in this case, Montana v. United States.95
The Court's decision in Montana did not negate that statement. The Court did define the limits of the Indians' retained
sovereignty more narrowly than it had in previous cases. One
might conclude that the Court decreed the end to Indian
sovereignty over fee lands with its common sense statement of
purchasers' expectations and Congress' intentions regarding
allotted lands. 98 However, the Court made clear in its later
analysis of Indian sovereignty that this was not its intent.
See text accompanying note 75 supra
See Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1255 n.9.
419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
Id. The question in the case concerned tribal authority to regulate activities on land owned by non-Indians.
94. United States v. Wheeler, supra note 77, at 323.
95. Montana v. United States, supra note 1, at 1257.
96. Id. at 1255, n.9.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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The Court was faced with a difficult problem in Montana v.
UnitedStates. Probably the Court is correct when it states that
non-Indians could not have expected to be submitting
themselves to tribal jurisdiction when they purchased
allotments. Nevertheless, the policies behind allotment have
since been repudiated.9 7 The Indian Reorganization Act reaffirmed the partial sovereignty retained by Indian Tribes.
Indians' expectations as to their rights to exercise the
sovereign powers they retain within the physical limits of their
jurisdiction, deserve as much consideration as non-Indians' expectations concerning the control of their property. Some accommodation must be reached between the rights of the opposing parties in this situation.
The Court's decision in Montana v. United States is an
attempt at an accommodation. The answer it provides to the
problems raised may be limited to the facts of this case. Nevertheless, the Court's decision indicates that accommodations,
rather than total destruction of rights, are its goal. The question the Court's decision raises is to what extent fee-holder's
exercise of traditional property rights will be allowed to infringe on Indian treaty rights in their reservations.
CONCLUSION

Both issues presented in Montana v. United States pitted
Indian rights against the interests of non-Indian Americans.
The Supreme Court resolved the question of ownership of the
bed of the Big Horn River by looking to presumptions in favor
of state ownership and ignoring presumptions that might lead
to a finding of Indian ownership. The Court dealt with the
issue of Indian power to control activities within the reservation by narrowly construing the scope of tribal authority over
the activities of non-Indians.
The conflicts giving rise to this case result from the clash
between the values and expectations possessed by two different cultures. The history of interaction between Indian
tribes and American society is fraught with such conflicts.
Although the Supreme Court attempted in part to balance the
97. Id.
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expectations of the opposing parties, its decision served to
reinforce an old pattern: when the expectations of white men
and Indians differ, it is most often the Indians' expectations
that give way.
ANN GIFFORD VANCE
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